Texas Wesleyan Law Review
Volume 4

Issue 2

Article 7

3-1-1998

Crawford v. Kirk: Wrongful Pregnancy and Traditional Tort Law
Principles
David Shurtz

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr

Recommended Citation
David Shurtz, Crawford v. Kirk: Wrongful Pregnancy and Traditional Tort Law Principles, 4 Tex. Wesleyan L.
Rev. 249 (1998).
Available at: https://doi.org/10.37419/TWLR.V4.I2.6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Texas Wesleyan Law Review by an authorized editor of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.

Shurtz: Crawford v. Kirk: Wrongful Pregnancy and Traditional Tort Law Pri

CRAWFORD v. KIRK:
WRONGFUL PREGNANCY AND
TRADITIONAL TORT LAW PRINCIPLES
INTRODUCTION

Sterilization, as a voluntary operation performed for the purpose of
preventing undesired pregnancies, has become an effective method of
birth control.1 However, if such a procedure fails to produce the desired sterility, due to negligence on the part of the physician, a
healthy, unwanted child may be conceived.' If an unwanted, healthy
child is conceived, the parents often bring an action for malpractice
against the physician who performed the failed sterilization. This
legal cause of action against a negligent doctor has become widely
known as a wrongful pregnancy or wrongful conception claim.3
Wrongful pregnancy or wrongful conception, by definition, refers to
an action brought by the parents of a healthy, but unwanted, unplanned, and unexpected child for negligence leading to pregnancy.4
Thirty-five jurisdictions uniformly recognize the validity of a wrongful pregnancy claim.5 Texas, however, is not one of those jurisdictions.
The majority of Texas courts recognize the validity of a wrongful pregnancy cause of action and award damages to the parents for an unwanted child, while other Texas courts do not.6 This Comment argues
1. See Jeff L. Milsteen, Comment, Recovery of Child RearingExpenses in Wrongful Birth Cases: A Motivational Analysis, 32 EMORY L.J. 1167, 1167 (1983).
2. See Lynne Wiggins, Comment, Marciniak v. Lundbrog: Physicianas Surrogate
Parents? Rolling the Dice for Recovery in Wrongful Conception Cases, 16 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 839, 839 (1993).
3. See Flax v. McNew, 896 S.W.2d 839, 841 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995, no writ). See
also Lisa A. Podewils, Note, Traditional Tort Principles and Wrongful Conception
Child-RearingDamages, 73 B.U. L. REV. 407 (1993). This Comment only addresses
the issue of wrongful pregnancy, otherwise known as wrongful conception, and does
not attempt to explore the areas known as wrongful birth or wrongful life. Wrongful
conception or wrongful pregnancy may be distinguished from wrongful birth and
wrongful life actions. Wrongful birth refers to "an action brought by parents on behalf of themselves for negligence leading to the birth of an abnormal child, for instance, following a negligently administered or omitted fetal testing. Recovery is
based on the premise that the parents would have aborted if they had known that the
child was going to be disabled, or that the child's impairment was caused by the physician's negligence." Flax, 896 S.W.2d at 841. Wrongful life refers to an action brought
by or on behalf of a child with such an impairment for negligence leading to his or her
impaired life. See id.
4. See Flax, 896 S.W.2d at 841.
5. See Bret S. Simmons, Comment, Zehr v. Haugen and the Oregon Approach to
Wrongful Conception: An Occasion for Celebration or Litigation?, 31 WILLAME'rrE
L. REV. 121, 122-23 (1995).
6. See Crawford v. Kirk, 929 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, writ denied); Naugle v. Theard, 917 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, writ denied); Flax
v. McNew, 896 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995, no writ); Zapata v. Rosenfeld,
811 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied); Hickman v. Myers, 632 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Sutkin v. Beck,
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that Texas should recognize a wrongful pregnancy cause of action for
two reasons: (1) all but one Texas court explicitly recognizes a wrongful pregnancy claim; and (2) a wrongful pregnancy claim is merely a
descriptive label for medical malpractice. Moreover, the damages for
such a claim should consist of (1) the medical damages associated with
the pregnancy and birth, (2) damages in excess of a mother's medical
expenses,7 and (3) financial expenses for education and maintenance
of the normal, healthy child until the age of majority. Therefore, in a
wrongful pregnancy cause of action, Texas should follow the Full Recovery Rule8 that permits parents to prove all damages proximately
resulting from a negligent sterilization including child-rearing costs.
Part I of this Comment will evaluate whether Texas should recognize a wrongful pregnancy cause of action. Part II will evaluate the
three common methods of calculating and awarding damages in a
wrongful pregnancy claim; Limited Recovery, Full Recovery, and the
Benefits Rule. Finally, this Comment concludes that allowing parents
to prove and recover child-rearing damages strengthens the family
unit, maintains the best interest of the child, and is the best method to
advance the goals of tort law and Texas public policy.
I.

TEXAS'S APPROACH TO A WRONGFUL PREGNANCY CLAIM

A.

Should Texas Recognize a Wrongful Pregnancy Action?

The Texas Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the validity of a
claim arising from a wrongful pregnancy cause of action. However,
the court has issued opinions and rulings on a number of closely-related questions that provide guidance in determining whether the
court will recognize the validity of a wrongful pregnancy claim.
The first Texas case to address the issue of wrongful pregnancy was
the 1972 decision in Hays v. Hall.9 An action was brought against a
doctor of osteopathy for negligence arising from the performance of a
vasectomy operation on the plaintiff husband. 10 The couple desired a
vasectomy because Mrs. Hays had previously given birth to two dis629 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Silva v. Howe, 608 S.W.2d
840 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Garwood v. Locke, 522
S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Terrell v. Garcia,
496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hays v. Hall,
477 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastand), rev'd, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972).
7. See Flax, 896 S.W.2d at 843 (indicating elements of damage may include: (1)
prenatal and postnatal medical expenses; (2) the mother's pain and suffering during
the pregnancy and delivery; (3) loss of consortium; (4) the cost of a second corrective
sterilization procedure; (5) lost wages; (6) pain and suffering associated with the corrective procedure; and (7) any permanent impairment suffered by the parents as a
result of the pregnancy, delivery, or the corrective procedure).
8. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
9. 477 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland), rev'd, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972).
10. See id. at 403.
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abled children. 1' The court concluded that the facts of the case did
not justify any recovery of damages for the birth of their healthy
child. 12 As a result, the intermediate court was not compelled to compensate the parents for the birth of their undesired child despite the
doctor's negligence.
On appeal, however, the Texas Supreme Court reversed in an opinion addressing only the statute of limitations point. 3 The court, without qualification, reversed and remanded the entire cause for a new
trial on the merits. 4 By this action, Texas courts have taken the reversal and remand as a clear indication that the1 5 Texas Supreme Court
would recognize a wrongful pregnancy claim.
In Jacobs v. Theimer,16 the parents of a child born with disabilities
brought suit against a doctor for failing to diagnose rubella, an illness
that occurred during the wife's pregnancy.1 7 The Texas Supreme
Court reversed a summary judgment for the doctor and allowed the
case to proceed to trial.1 8 Citing Hays, the court held that recovery
would be limited to the expenses reasonably necessary for the care
and treatment of the child's physical impairment, even though the parents had also sought damages for their own emotional suffering.19
Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court-without ruling directly on the
issue of wrongful pregnancy-implicitly recognized the validity of a
wrongful pregnancy claim and emphasized that damages other than
for emotional suffering may be recoverable in medical malpractice actions if properly established.2"
In Nelson v. Krusen,2 1 the parents of a child born with muscular
dystrophy brought suit alleging that the doctor negligently advised the
mother that she was not a genetic carrier of Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy.22 Relying on Jacobs, the court allowed the parents to collect
damages for care and treatment of the child's physical impairment.2 3
11. See id.
12. See id. at 406.
13. See Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex. 1973) (holding that in cases alleging negligent performance of a vasectomy the statutory period for filing suit does not
begin until the patient learns that the procedure was ineffective).
14. See id.
15. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 925 (Tex. 1984); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519
S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex. 1975); Crawford v. Kirk, 929 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, writ denied); Naugle v. Theard, 917 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995,
writ denied); Flax v. McNew, 896 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995, no writ); Hickman v. Myers, 632 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Garwood v. Locke, 522 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
16. 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
17. See id. at 848.
18. See id. at 847.
19. See id. at 850.
20. See id.
21. 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984).
22. See id. at 919.
23. See id. at 924.
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The court indicated that the basic rule of tort compensation-to put
the plaintiff in the position he would have been absent the defendant's
negligence-should apply in malpractice actions.2 4
Hays, Jacobs, and Nelson thus hold that the parents of an impaired
child, born as a result of another's negligence, may recover the economic costs of care and treatment of the child's impairment. These
cases do not directly address the validity of a wrongful pregnancy
claim when the pregnancy culminates in the birth of a healthy child.
However, these cases give a clear indication that a wrongful pregnancy claim should be a viable or maintainable action under Texas
law.
B.

Zapata v. Rosenfeld-Out of Step with Texas Jurisprudenceby
Not Recognizing a Wrongful Pregnancy Claim

In Texas, ten intermediate courts have directly addressed the viability or maintainability of a wrongful pregnancy claim.2 5 Zapata v. Rosenfeld 26 is the only court out of step with other Texas courts. Zapata
did not recognize a cause of action for wrongful pregnancy. In
Zapata, the plaintiff gave birth to a healthy, full-term infant after a
failed abortion. 27 The court noted the plaintiff did not plead an action
for wrongful pregnancy and "even if she had properly presented her
complaint, Texas does not recognize a cause of action for wrongful
pregnancy.'28 Zapata cites two Texas appellate cases in arriving at its
decision,2 9 Silva v. Hall 30 and Sutkin v. Beck.3 However, the court's
reliance on Silva and Sutkin may be mistaken since these cases recognized a claim for wrongful pregnancy but limited the types of damages
awarded.3 2
If the Texas Supreme Court were to rule today on the validity of a
wrongful pregnancy claim, the court would likely consider it a viable
and maintainable action. Further, only the Zapata court does not rec24. See id. at 924-25.
25. See Crawford v. Kirk, 929 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, writ denied); Naugle v. Theard, 917 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1995, writ denied); Flax
v. McNew, 896 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995, no writ); Zapata v. Rosenfeld,
811 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied); Hickman v. Myers, 632 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Sutkin v. Beck,
629 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Silva v. Howe, 608 S.W.2d
840 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Garwood v. Locke, 552
S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Terrell v. Garcia,
496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
26. 811 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1991, writ denied); Hays v.
Hall, 477 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972), rev'd, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex.
1972).
27. See id. at 182-83.
28. Id. at 184.
29. See id.
30. 608 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
31. 629 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
32. See Silva, 608 S.W.2d at 842; Sutkin, 629 S.W.2d at 132.
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ognize a wrongful pregnancy claim. Since it appears that Texas would
recognize a wrongful pregnancy claim, the next question that needs to
be answered is: to what extent should Texas award compensatory
damages?
II.
A.

WRONGFUL PREGNANCY DAMAGES

Conflicts Associated with an Award of Damages

The Texas intermediate courts are not uniform in characterizing and
awarding compensatory damages for a wrongful pregnancy claim.
The principal controversy regarding a wrongful pregnancy action involves determining what items of damages are proper. The controversy over damages can be subdivided into two main issues: (1)
whether damages in excess of medical expenses should be awarded to
the parents after a negligent sterilization, and (2) whether damages for
support and maintenance of a healthy child should also be awarded.
B.

Common Rules Used in Determining an Award of Damages

Texas, like other jurisdictions, has evaluated the three basic rules of
recovery in determining an award of damages. These variations include: (1) a Limited Recovery Rule; (2) a Full Recovery Rule; and (3)
a Benefits Rule. 33 The Limited Recovery Rule allows parents to recover damages which occur as a direct result of pregnancy and birth,
but not child-rearing CoStS. 34 The Full Recovery Rule allows parents
to recover damages which occur as a direct result of pregnancy and
birth, and includes child-rearing expenses.35 The Benefits Rule allows
for the recovery of all damages in the full recovery, but the award is
offset by the benefits the parents will receive by having a normal,
healthy child.36

1. Limited Recovery Rule
a.

Texas Approach to the Limited Recovery Rule

Four Texas appellate courts have directly addressed the issue concerning the recovery of damages in excess of medical expenses when a
normal, healthy child is born following a failed sterilization. 37 All four
of the courts concluded that the mother is entitled to reimbursement
of medical expenses associated with the pregnancy and birth of the
33. See Flax, 896 S.W.2d at 843.
34. See id.
35. See Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603 (N.M. 1991).
36. See Flax, 896 S.W.2d at 843.
37. See Crawford v. Kirk, 929 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, writ denied); Naugle v. Theard, 917 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1995, writ denied); Flax
v. McNew, 896 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995, no writ); Garwood v. Locke, 552
S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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unwanted child.38 However, as discussed below, only one Texas court
expressly approves of recovering damages in excess of medical
expenses.39
In Garwood v. Locke,4° the plaintiff brought suit arising from an
unsuccessful sterilization operation. At issue in Garwood was
whether the plaintiff could recover damages for medical expenses, loss
of earnings, and physical pain and mental anguish.4 ' The San Antonio
Court of Civil Appeals remanded the entire case for a new trial, holding that a cause of action had been stated for recovery of medical
damages. 42 In arriving at its decision, the court distinguished Garwood from its previous decision in Terrell v. Garcia,43 where the issue
was limited to the narrow question of whether damages for monetary
expenses for the care and maintenance of an unwanted child could be
recovered.4 The Garwood court noted the plaintiffs sought other
damages including medical expenses. 45 Therefore, the court in Garwood recognized the recoverability of medical expenses associated
with the birth of the unwanted child but did not rule on the recoverability of a mother's lost wages or physical pain and mental anguish.46
The next Texas case to develop and expand the limited damages
theory as established in Garwood was Flax v. McNew. 47 Flax is a leading case in Texas jurisprudence because the court allowed, for the first
time, recovery of damages in excess of medical expenses for wrongful
pregnancy.48 In Flax, a mother gave birth to a healthy child after a
failed sterilization procedure. 49 The mother alleged damages based
on permanent scars, physical impairment during and immediately after pregnancy, physical and mental pain and suffering, and medical
expenses.50 The Flax court concluded that damages in excess of medical expenses should be allowed if properly proved.5" The court stated,
"In our view, the question is not whether Texas will recognize a new
cause of action for 'wrongful pregnancy' or 'wrongful conception.'

Texas has long allowed recovery for negligence by medical practition38. See Crawford, 929 S.W.2d at 637; Naugle, 917 S.W.2d at 292; Flax, 896 S.W.2d
at 845; Garwood, 552 S.W.2d at 895.
39. See Flax, 896 S.W.2d at 845.
40. 552 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
41. See id. at 893.
42. See id. at 895.
43. 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also
discussion infra Part I1.B.2.a.
44. See Garwood, 552 S.W.2d at 894.
.45. See id. at 894 (distinguishing and clarifying the San Antonio Court of Appeals
position on the validity of a wrongful pregnancy claim and the type of damages
recoverable).
46. See id. at 895.
47. 896 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995, no writ).
48. See id. at 845.
49. See id. at 840.
50. See id. at 839.
51. See id. at 845.
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ers. Wrongful52pregnancy is 'merely a descriptive label for a form of
malpractice.' ,
The Justices in Flax based their reasoning on a 1992 Missouri
Supreme Court case, Girdley v. Coats.5 3 In applying the reasoning established in Girdley, the court in Flax held that upon a proper showing
of medical negligence, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover damages
based on permanent scars, pain, suffering, physical impairment during
and immediately after pregnancy, mental pain and suffering, and medical expenses. 54 However, the court qualified its holding by indicating
that the damages the plaintiff alleged were not "exclusive damages
recoverable in this type of medical malpractice suit."'55 As a result,
Flax stands for the proposition that if a plaintiff makes a proper showing of negligence she can recover an unlimited or unspecified number
of damages from the negligent physician.56
In Naugle v. Theard,57 the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice
action based on the physician's failure to ligate both fallopian tubes
during a requested bilateral tubal ligation.5 8 In an opinion dealing
strictly with a statute of limitations issue, the court cited Flax and Garwood for the proposition that damages in excess of medical expenses
59
had been recoverable upon a proper showing of medical negligence.
In addition, the court referred to a federal district court case that cited
Garwood as Texas precedent in allowing a claim in tort for negligent
failure of a physician to sterilize effectively.6" Although not ruling directly on the validity of a wrongful pregnancy claim, Naugle can be
cited for the proposition that at least one Texas court recognizes an
award of damages in excess of medical expenses since they specifically
approved of the possibility for recovery of damages.
It appears that Garwood, Flax, and Naugle have created a trend in
granting damages in excess of medical expenses for negligent steriliza52. Id. at 843 (quoting Girdley v. Coats, 825 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Mo. 1992)).
53. 825 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Mo. 1992) (noting that as of 1992, more than twenty-five
states have adopted the Limited Recovery Rule).
54. See Flax, 896 S.W.2d at 845 (citing Girdley, 825 S.W.2d at 298-99 for a list of
possible elements of damage: (1) prenatal and postnatal medical expenses; (2) the
mother's pain and suffering during the pregnancy and delivery; (3) loss of consortium;
(4) the cost of a second- corrective sterilization procedure; (5) emotional distress; (6)
lost wages; (7) pain and suffering associated with the corrective procedure; and (8)
any permanent impairment suffered by the parents as a result of the pregnancy, delivery, or the corrective procedure).
55. Id. at 845 (referring to damages listed in Girdley, 825 S.W.2d at 298-99; Smith
v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738, 751 (Tenn. 1987); McKernan v. Aasheim, 687 P.2d 850, 856
(Wash. 1984); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 453 A.2d 974, 976 (Pa. 1982); Beardsley v.
Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 289 (Wyo. 1982)).
56. See id.
57. 917 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, writ denied).
58. See id.
59. See id. at 291.
60. See id. (citing Hartke v. McKelway, 526 F. Supp. 97, 100 (D.C.C. 1981)).
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tions. However, the 1996 case of Crawford v. Kirk6 1 broke any such
trend, and now limits the recovery of the parents of a healthy, but
unwanted, child to medical expenses associated with the pregnancy
and birth.
b.

Crawford v. Kirk-Awarding Only Minimal
Compensatory Damages

On September 6, 1988, after delivering her second child, Mrs.
Tammy Crawford underwent a tubal ligation to prevent the possibility
of having more children. 62 The Crawfords did not want additional
children due to the family's poor financial circumstances. 63 Dr. John
Kirk performed the tubal ligation. 64 After completing the procedure,
he informed the Crawfords that Mrs. Crawford was sterile and that
the further use of contraceptives was not necessary.65
In January of 1989, Mrs. Crawford discovered that she was pregnant.66 Throughout her pregnancy she experienced various medical
problems and was finally hospitalized until delivery of her healthy
twins on August 14, 1989.67 The Crawfords brought an action against
Dr. Kirk in 1990, seeking damages for all medical expenses associated
with the pregnancy, physical and mental pain and suffering, and the
costs of raising the twins to the age of majority.68
The trial court granted summary judgment for Dr. Kirk concluding
that there is no cause of action in Texas for wrongful pregnancy.69
The Texarkana Court of Appeals remanded the cause for a new trial.7 °
The intermediate court concluded that a wrongful pregnancy claim
was maintainable in Texas. 7 ' However, the court held that parents of
a normal, healthy child born after a failed sterilization procedure may
only recover damages for their actual medical expenses associated
with the pregnancy. 72 The court specifically ruled out the possibility
of collecting damages in excess of medical expenses for the failed
medical procedure.73
61. 929 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, writ denied).
62. See id. at 635.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 638.
71. See id. at 637.
72. See id. at 637 ("[I]n light of those cases in which the Texas Supreme Court has
either written an opinion or denied writ of error, it is concluded that at the present
time the parents of a normal, healthy child born after a failed sterilization procedure
may recover damages for their actual medical expenses as a result of the failed
procedure.").
73. See id.
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The court concluded that Garwood approved of recovery only for
medical expenses and that Flax's expansion of the type of damages
recoverable in a wrongful pregnancy suit contradicted existing Texas
authority."4 The court indicated that Flax today stands as an anomaly,
rather than as a landmark, in Texas jurisprudence.7 5
Crawford validly pointed out that the Texas Supreme Court in Jacobs v. Theimer 76 limited recovery of damages to the expenses for
care and treatment of the child's physical impairment, rejecting as
speculative the parent's claim for emotional suffering.17 Crawford
emphasized that Flax failed even to mention the holding in Jacobs and
thus failed to explain why the parents of a healthy child could recover
for emotional suffering while the parents of a disabled child in Jacobs
could not.78 Although Crawford clearly points out that Flax erred in
allowing recovery of damages for emotional suffering, Flax still stands
as valid Texas precedent in allowing recovery of damages in excess of
medical expenses for a wrongful pregnancy claim based on traditional
tort law principles.7 9
c.

Recognition of the Limited Recovery Rule in Other States

Courts in various states have allowed recovery on the basis of traditional tort principles for wrongful pregnancy of a healthy baby.8 0 For
example, Wyoming allows damages in excess of medical expenses but
rejects claims for child-rearing expenses.8" In Beardsley v. Wierdsma,
the Wyoming Supreme Court rejected post-birth expenses as too speculative.8" The court found such expenses out of proportion to the culpability of the doctor and recognized they would open the legal flood
gates to fraudulent claims.8 3 Missouri considers the claim of wrongful
pregnancy as a form of medical malpractice, and when damages are
measurable and proven, they should be awarded.8 4 Tennessee views
wrongful pregnancy as an ordinary common law tort, indicating that a
plaintiff may recover damages for the foreseeable consequences "di74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
Hosp.,
nan v.

See id.
See id.
519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
See Crawford, 929 S.W.2d at 637.
See id.
See id.
See, e.g., Girdley v. Coats, 825 S.W.2d 295 (Mo. 1992); Mason v. Western Pa.
453 A.2d 974 (Pa. 1982); Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. 1987); McKerAasheim, 687 P.2d 850 (Wash. 1984); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288

(Wyo. 1982).
81. See Beardsley, 650 P.2d at 292.
82. See id.
83. See id.

84. See Girdley, 825 S.W.2d at 298 (indicating that measurable damages might include: prenatal and postnatal medical expenses; the mother's pain and suffering during the pregnancy and delivery; loss of wages; loss of consortium; and any permanent
impairment suffered by the parents as a result of the pregnancy, the delivery, or the
second corrective procedure).
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rectly related to the pregnancy and delivery." 85 New Mexico also considers wrongful pregnancy as an ordinary claim for negligence or
medical malpractice and follows ordinary principles of tort law in
compensating the aggrieved plaintiff.86
Recovery of damages in excess of medical expenses represents the
better reasoned position because such recovery allows the plaintiffs to

be placed as nearly as possible in the position they would have been in
had there been no negligent act. To allow recovery of only medical

expenses associated with the birth of the child leaves the plaintiff to
bear the burden of lost wages and to suffer the pains of an unwanted

pregnancy without compensation. Many families rely on two incomes
to meet their financial needs. Yet, Texas courts allow families to fi-

nancially suffer when one of the wage earners loses her ability to contribute-by being required to stay home and care for the unplanned,
although healthy, baby-through no fault of her own.

2.
a.

Full Recovery Rule

Texas Approach to Full Recovery Rule

One area of a wrongful pregnancy action in which Texas courts are

uniform is in the denial of compensatory damages for the maintenance and education of a child conceived after a failed sterilization.
All ten intermediate courts that have addressed a wrongful pregnancy
claim have concluded that recovery of financial expenses for education and maintenance of a normal, healthy child should be barred by
reasons of public policy.87 The Texas courts, however, continue to

base their legal reasoning and decisions largely on antiquated public
policy considerations that were established and developed by cases
prior to 1970. Texas courts continue to deny the award of child rearing damages despite other states' awarding such costs.
85. Smith, 728 S.W.2d at 750-51 (indicating damages may include: costs of prenatal care; medical expenses; pain and suffering; loss of wages during pregnancy; and
damages for emotional distress).
.86. See Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603, 609 (N.M. 1991) (indicating
plaintiff's damages undisputably include pain and suffering associated with the pregnancy and birth, the cost of a subsequent sterilization, and other expenses, such as lost
wages associated with the pregnancy and birth). In this case, New Mexico also
adopted the Full Recovery rule discussed further at Part II.B.2. See id. at 612.
87. See Crawford v. Kirk, 929 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, writ denied); Naugle v. Theard, 917 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1995, writ denied); Flax
v. McNew, 896 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995, no writ); Zapata v. Rosenfeld,
811 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied); Hickman v. Myers, 632 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Sutkin v. Beck,
629 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Silva v. Howe, 608 S.W.2d
840 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Garwood v. Locke, 522
S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Terrell v. Garcia,
496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hays v. Hall,
477 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland), rev'd, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972).
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The uniformly recognized rule prior to 1967 was that no damages
resulted from the birth of a normal child when there was no permanent harm to the mother.88 The birth of a normal child was considered a gift to the parents rather than an injury, and awarding damages
on such grounds would violate public policy. In other words, if parents were to be given monetary damages as well as the love and affection received from their newborn child, they would be unjustly
enriched while the doctor would be unduly burdened. However, what
the Texas courts and many other state courts never considered is that
parents have a constitutional right to limit the size of their families
and a corresponding right to financial security.89 These rights should
not be frustrated by the negligent act of a third party doctor. Often,
parents in today's society plan the size of their family based on their
available financial resources. In an effort to limit family growth, many
parents consciously choose sterilization as an attractive alternative to
other forms of contraception. 90 However, when a sterilization procedure fails, they are left with another child to feed, house, clothe, and
educate.
It is not to say that the parents do not love the unexpected child or
do not want to nurture the newborn child; it is simply that families
should not have a child thrust upon them by a negligent doctor. Texas
courts are reluctant to allow child-rearing damages because of a social
policy which argues that the benefits of a child far outweigh the economic burdens of the child's maintenance and education. Texas's public policy, however, should be changed to reflect the reality of today's
society. Texas courts need to take into consideration that society has
evolved from an agricultural one, where children worked on farms
and contributed to their family's economic stability, to an industrial
society where children do not contribute to the economic well-being
of the family.
Texas courts also need to take into consideration that "[t]he basic
rule of tort compensation is that the plaintiff is to be put in the posi88. See, e.g., Christensen v. Thornby 255 N.W. 620, 622 (Minn. 1934) (holding that
a husband could not collect damages for anxiety and expenses associated with his
wife's pregnancy even though the attempted sterilization was performed out of fear
the wife might lose her life because both mother and child were healthy after the
birth). See also Ball v. Mudge, 391 P.2d 201 (Wash. 1964) (stating a reasonable jury
could conclude the costs incidental to the birth of a normal, healthy child from an
unwanted pregnancy were far outweighed by the blessing such a child would be).
89. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that state laws
prohibiting the use of contraceptives violates the constitutional right to marital privacy). See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (stating that "[i]f the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to

be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.") (emphasis added

by the Court).
90. See Podewils, supra note 3, at 407 n.1.
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tion that he would have been in absent the defendant's negligence."91
"In a personal injury case, that standard requires a comparison of the
condition that the plaintiff would have been in without the negligence
with the plaintiff's actual condition as a result of the defendant's
negligence."92

Instead, Texas courts continue to follow the proposition that a child
is a gift rather than a detriment.93 In fact, many parents of unexpected
children would agree that a child is a gift. However, Texas courts need
to realize that the harm or injury to the parents is not in the birth of
the child, but is instead in the invasion of the parents' legally protected interest in the financial security of their family. Therefore, the
harm suffered by the parents as a result of the negligent operation is
not the birth itself, but the economic burden placed on the family who
chose not to procreate. None of the Texas cases addressing wrongful
pregnancy have evaluated this approach and erroneously continue to
deny compensation for an ordinary negligence tort.
The first Texas appellate court to rule directly on the issue of childrearing damages in a wrongful pregnancy claim was Terrell v. Garcia.94
Terrell is a leading case in Texas on wrongful pregnancy and has established a legal foundation upon which subsequent Texas cases have
been built. In Terrell, the plaintiff parents brought an action seeking
to recover the economic loss they would undergo in rearing and educating an undesired child.95 The issue on appeal was whether the parents of an unwanted, but normal, healthy child conceived after an
unsuccessful sterilization operation on the mother, may recover from
the doctor for the financial expenses of the care and maintenance of a
newborn child.9 6 All other items of damage, such as medical expense,

as well as pain and mental anguish of the mother incident to the birth
of the child, were waived by the plaintiffs.97
The court held that even if negligence on the part of the physician
in performance of the sterilization operation was assumed, the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover damages for care and maintenance of
a healthy child.98 The court reasoned that "the satisfaction, joy and
companionship which normal parents have in rearing a child make
such economic loss worthwhile." 99 In addition, the court stated that
91. Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 924-25 (Tex. 1984).
92. Id.
93. See Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
94. 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
95. See id. at 125.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 128.

99. Id.
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these "intangible benefits, while impossible to value in dollars and
cents are undoubtedly the things that make life worthwhile."1 '
Chief Justice Barrow, writing the majority opinion, stated that
"[r]ather than attempt to value these intangible benefits, our courts
have simply determined that public sentiment recognizes that these
benefits to the parents outweigh their economic loss in rearing and
educating a healthy, normal child. We see no compelling reason to
change such a rule at this time."' 1 In conclusion, the court posed the
following question: "[w]ho can place a price
tag on a child's smile or
10 2
parental pride in a child's achievement?
One key fact that must be pointed out, however, is that Terrell
based its reasoning and public policy views-the denial of child rearing expenses-on Hays, which was ultimately reversed and remanded
to trial by the Texas Supreme Court. 0 3 As a result, Terrell-the leading case in Texas in denying child-rearing damages-based its reasoning and conclusions on a case that was ultimately disapproved of by
the Texas Supreme Court.
Following the legal precedent established by Terrell, subsequent intermediate courts have ruled that the expenses of rearing a child are
not recoverable. In Silva v. Howe,

°4

the court simply cited to Terrell

and remarked that "[a] parent is not entitled to recover damages from
a physician for the projected expenses of rearing and educating an
unwanted child." 10 5
In Sutkin v. Beck, °6 the court concluded that the Texas Supreme
Court does not recognize child rearing damages and held that parents
could not recover anticipated expenses of rearing a healthy child conceived after an unsuccessful sterilization operation.10 7 The court
stated,
In Jacobs, the [Texas] supreme court expressly recognizes the distinction made by the courts of civil appeals between damages resulting from birth of a physically deformed child, which are
recoverable, and damages resulting from the expenses of rearing a
healthy child, which are subject to an objection 'based on speculation as to the quality of life and as to pluses and minuses of parental
mind and emotion. '108

In addition, the court in Sutkin pointed out that the Texas Supreme
Court in Jacobs made reference to Terrell-the intermediate court
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 130 (Cadena, J., dissenting) (discussing Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412
(Tex. 1972)).
104. 608 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
105. Id. at 842.
106. 629 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
107. See id. at 132.
108. Id. (quoting Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849-50 (Tex. 1975)).
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that denied child-rearing damages-without any suggestion of approval or disapproval." 9 Thus, the Sutkin court believed that silence
on the part of the Texas Supreme Court in merely citing Terrell indicated that Texas would not award child-rearing damages in a wrongful
pregnancy claim. The mere cite to Terrell in the Texas Supreme Court
opinion may or may not indicate approval of Terrell and its denial of
child-rearing damages. However, a more direct ruling from the Texas
Supreme Court is needed before it can be definitively or conclusively
stated that Texas denies recovery of child rearing damages.
Other courts citing Terrell elaborated on its conclusions. For instance, in Hickman v. Myers," ° the appellate court held that childrearing damages are not allowed by Texas courts."' The court indicated that Terrell was accurate Texas precedent and should be followed, stating "the cost of raising a healthy child born as a result of
the negligent performance of a sterilization operation on the mother is
not recoverable from the physician."' 2
The public policy view as established in Terrell vis-A-vis Hays has
formed the basis for Texas jurisprudence on the issue of wrongful
pregnancy. However, reacting to the majority opinion in Terrell, Justice Cadena, in dissent, wrote, "It should not be overlooked that, however persuasive may be the reasoning of the [Hay's court], that
judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court of Texas." ' 1 3 Justice
Cadena added, "The reversal of the judgment of the Court of Civil
Appeals was unqualified, and the Supreme Court remanded the case
to the trial court for trial on the merits.""' 4 The remand to trial on the
merits is important because it suggests that the Texas Supreme Court
did not want Hays to carry any impressive precedential weight." 5
However, despite the reversal, many courts, including Terrell, have
built upon Hays' reasoning" 6 even though it is "open to question
whether that reversed opinion deserves the designation 'law of the
case.' "117
Furthermore, Justice Cadena stressed, "Even if the opinion of the
Court of Civil Appeals in Hays be regarded as the law of That case, it
is not law of This case."' 1 8 In other words, each wrongful pregnancy
culminating in the birth of a healthy child needs to be evaluated on
109. See id.
110. 632 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
111. See id. at 872.
112. Id.
113. Terrell, 496 S.W.2d at 130 (Cadena, J., dissenting).
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. See Silva v. Howe, 608 S.W. 2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
117. Id.
118. Terrell, 496 S.W.2d at 130 (Cadena, J., dissenting).

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol4/iss2/7
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V4.I2.6

14

Shurtz: Crawford v. Kirk: Wrongful Pregnancy and Traditional Tort Law Pri

19981

WRONGFUL PREGNANCY

the merits to determine if a claim for negligence can be maintained. If
the claim for negligence can be maintained, the plaintiffs should be
compensated for the increased economic burden thrust upon them
through no fault of their own.
In Terrell, the majority's reliance on Hays appears to be misplaced." 9 Hays simply "[b]egs the question by assuming that a man
and woman who want no children will derive joy and satisfaction, that
is, they will receive a 'benefit,' by having the obligation of raising a
child thrust upon them as a result of a doctor's negligence."' 2 ° "There
is no basis for the assumption that [parents] will derive any joy and
satisfaction from raising an unwanted child."'' In fact, parents of an
unwanted child made a conscious decision to become permanently
sterile and relied on the doctor's expertise to accomplish that end.
Thus, one might conclude that the parents would not derive joy from
raising the child but instead would incur hardship.
In Hays, the intermediate court stated that to "[a]llow damages for
the birth and upbringing of a normal child would mean that the doctor
would have to pay for the satisfaction, joy, and affection which normal
parents would ordinarily have in the rearing and education of a
healthy child."'1 22 However,
[t]he question is not whether a doctor should be forced 'to pay for
the satisfaction, and joy, and affection which ...
parents would ordi-

narily have in the rearing and education of a healthy child.' The
question [should be instead,] whether a negligent doctor should be
held responsible for the consequences of his negligence. 23
Lower standards of care for doctors in sterilization operations collides
with the right of the parents of a family to choose its size, a right given
to the parents by the United States Constitution. 24
Prior United States Supreme Court decisions have established the
legal right of a person to resort to procedures which will prevent conception and, within certain limits, to terminate an existing preg2 In Doe v. Bolton, 226 Justice Douglas, concurring, concluded
nancy. 125
127

that freedom of choice to procreate is a basic decision of one's life.

119. See id. at 129.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Hays v. Hall, 477 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland), rev'd, 488
S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972).
123. Terrell, 496 S.W.2d at 129 (Cadena, J., dissenting) (quoting Hays, 477 S.W.2d
at 406).
124. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that state laws
prohibiting the use of contraceptives violate the constitutional right to marital privacy). See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1971) (indicating that parents
should be allowed to limit the size of their family without governmental intrusion).
125. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
126. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
127. See id. at 211 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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In Eisenstadtv. Baird,128 the Court stated that "[i]f the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear a
child. ' 129 Therefore, it should be impermissible to say that social policy should require that a husband and wife be denied the right to limit
the number of children which they will bring into the world. Furthermore, it is inconsistent with United States Supreme Court precedent
to say that a negligent, third party doctor should be allowed to frustrate the realization of the married couple's aim to limit the size of
their family. 130
A social policy assuring that doctors may, without fear of incurring
liability, negligently perform sterilization operations does nothing to
increase the importance of the family unit in our society.13 1 In fact,
the added economic stress in raising and educating an unexpected
child may weaken the family unit. The burden may lead parents to
divorce and cause the child to be the product of a broken home.
Texas courts are reluctant to award damages because they are considered speculative and difficult to determine. 1 32 However, as Justice
Cadena stated, "[it may, indeed, be difficult to 'place a price tag on a
child's smile.' But there is no support for the conclusion that the task
cannot be performed.' 33 For example, "[i]n [loss of consortium]
suits, [Texas] courts have awarded the injured spouse damages for...
loss of 'affection, society, comforts and assistance of' the spouse whose
affections have been alienated.' 1 34 Therefore, if the courts in a loss of
consortium case can place a price tag on the value of a spouse's smile,
there is no reason why the courts cannot do the same in calculating
the price of maintaining a child's smile in a wrongful pregnancy action. 35 Just because "the extent of damages may be difficult to ascertain should not cause the courts to throw up their hands in
frustration"'' 36 and deny recovery of financial damages for child maintenance and education.
In the conclusion to his dissenting opinion, Justice Cadena notes,
[there is] no reason for departing from the rule that a negligent person is liable for the foreseeable consequences of his negligence.
There is no justification for holding, as a matter of law, that the
birth of an 'unwanted' child is a 'blessing.' The birth of such a child
may be a catastrophe not only for the parents and the child itself,
128. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
129. Id. at 453.
130. See id.

131. See Terrell, 496 S.W.2d at 128 (Cadena, J., dissenting).
132. See id.
133. Id. at 129.

134. Id.
135. See id.

136. Id.
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but also for previously born siblings. The doctor whose negligence
brings about such an undesired birth should not be allowed to say 'I
did you a favor,' secure in the knowledge that the courts
137 will give to
this claim the effect of an irrebuttable presumption.

Justice Cadena's 1973 dissent in Terrell expresses legitimate points
of concern for today's society. The idea that a doctor cannot be held
responsible for his negligent acts associated with a wrongful pregnancy flies blatantly in the face of a couple's constitutional right to
marry and limit the size of their family. On the one hand, parents are
given the power as derived from the United States Constitution to
decide whether to procreate. However, Texas courts disallow them
control over that power and further frustrate the process by exposing
the negligent doctor to only limited liability. In other words, doctors
in Texas are given the right to interfere with parents' constitutional
rights with fear of only minimal reprisal.
How blatant does a negligent sterilization have to be before the
courts will award parents damages for child-rearing expenses? For example, what if the doctor after a sterilization procedure informs the
mother that she is sterile. If a baby is subsequently conceived, will the
Texas courts award damages to the parents for the added economic
burden on their family unit? According to the view taken by Texas
courts, the answer would probably be no. Texas courts have created a
doctrine that does not hold doctors fully liable for negligent
sterilizations.
What might happen if a single, indigent female becomes pregnant
after a failed sterilization procedure and dies while giving birth?
When the state takes custody of the unwanted child, assuming there
are no living relatives, should not the state be reimbursed for child
support and educational expenses incurred as a result of the doctor's
negligent act? Furthermore, should the taxpayers be reimbursed since
they are ultimately paying for the rearing and education of the unwanted, but healthy, child?
The Texas legislature has mandated that the "best interest" of the
child be at the forefront of all issues and decisions involving child custody138 and support. 139 Yet, the Texas courts are willing to allow a
child and that child's family to financially suffer because of the unwanted child's birth. The best interest of the child is not protected
when the family cannot adequately afford to provide for the unwanted
child. Not only will the unwanted child suffer, but so will the unwanted child's siblings as a result of his or her birth.
137. Terrell, 496 S.W.2d at 131 (Cadena, J., dissenting).
138. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.002 (Vernon's 1996) (stating that "[t]he best
interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration of the court in determining the issues of conservatorship and possession of and access to the child.").
139. See id. § 154.122.
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Allowing doctors to negligently perform sterilization operations
without fear of incurring liability does not further social policy. Tort
law is designed to deter wrongs and protect the public. 140 A policy
against protecting the public flies blatantly in the face of basic negligent tort actions. Negligent sterilization should not be considered differently from any other medical malpractice claim. Instead, Texas
courts should look at a wrongful pregnancy claim just like any other
negligent tort or medical malpractice cause of action. 141 Therefore, if
the elements of negligence can be established, damages for that claim
should be awarded without restrictions.
b. Recognition of the Full Recovery Rule in Other States
Several states have indicated that a wrongful pregnancy cause of
action is nothing more than a medical malpractice claim. 142 Lovelace
Medical Center v. Mendez 143 is representative of the reasoning used by
courts in upholding the Full Recovery Rule. In Lovelace, the court
held that parents of a normal, healthy baby conceived as a result of a
negligently performed sterilization could recover costs of raising the
child from birth to adulthood.4

The New Mexico Supreme Court

focused on factors that Texas courts have given little or no
consideration.
Texas courts are reluctant to award financial compensation to the
parents because they do not consider a healthy child a detriment. The
Lovelace court, however, concluded that an unsuccessful sterilization
operation results in two forms of "harm.' 1 45 First, the wife or husband remains fertile "despite their desire to be infertile.' 1 46 Second,
the couple's interest in financial security and in the economic stability
of their family will be impaired. 147 The undesired costs of raising a
child to adulthood, costs which couples desiring infertility strive to
avoid, would suddenly be "thrust upon them.' 1 48 The court considered these undesired costs as a detriment to the couple's pecuniary
140. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979).
141. See Flax v. McNew, 839 S.W.2d 839, 843 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995, no writ)
(stating "[i]n our view, the question is not whether Texas will recognize a new cause of
action for 'wrongful pregnancy' or 'wrongful conception.' Texas has long allowed recovery for negligence by medical practitioners. Wrongful pregnancy is 'merely a descriptive label for a form of malpractice.'").
142. See, e.g., University of Ariz. Health Servs. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 667 P.2d
1294 (Ariz. 1983); Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); Ochs v.
Borelli, 445 A.2d 883 (Conn. 1982); Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429 (Md. 1984);
Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d
169 (Minn. 1977); Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603 (N.M. 1991); Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. 1990).
143. 805 P.2d 603 (N.M. 1991).
144. See id. at 612.
145. See id. at 609-10 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(1)-(2) (1965)).
146. Id. at 610.
147. See id.

148. Id.
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interests because such costs constituted a harm.' 4 9 Therefore, the
harm resulting from conceiving a normal, healthy baby as a result of a
negligently performed sterilization is not the actual birth of the child.
The harm is the frustration stemming from the parents' desire to limit
the size of their family and the unlawful invasion of the parents' legally protected interest in financial security of their family.
Recovery of financial damages in tort actions should be grounded
on policy reasons. Tort actions are designed to put plaintiffs as nearly
as possible in the position they would have been absent the defendant's negligence.150 As a result, tort actions are designed to protect
the plaintiff against financial expenses or losses that are the result of a
defendant's negligence. The court in Lovelace recognized this by stating that compensatory damages, awarded to the plaintiff, "are also
designed to deter negligence, by insuring that a negligent act has consequences for the actor.' 151 Recovery of child-rearing expenses will
serve both of these purposes. 5 2
A number of [Texas] courts have held that the birth of a child
does not constitute a harm to the parents .... There appear to be

several notions encompassed in this policy judgment. First, at least
one commentator has suggested that this view is rooted in a time
when society was largely agricultural, and children were actively involved in those activities, thereby generating an economic benefit
for their parents. [However, the underlying premise for this] policy
has long since vanished. In a post-industrial society, the cost of raising a child usually exceeds the economic benefit, if any, the family
derives from the child.
Second, it appears that some [Texas] courts have adopted this position because they are concerned that allowing plaintiffs to recover
the expenses of raising a child is inconsistent with society's acknowl153
edgment of the sanctity of life and the high value place[d] on it.
Sanctity of human life, however, should not justify the denial of an
award of child-rearing expenses.' 5 4 The justification for denying expenses is apparent: "[T]wo people who have already decided that
they cannot afford to raise another child will be left to find a way to
do so.'

15

Society's respect for human life "should not be allowed to

obscure the fact that children need to be fed, clothed, housed, educated, and provided with medical care and other necessities."' 5 6
149. See id.
150. See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979).
151. Lovelace, 805 P.2d at 618-19 (N.M. 1991) (Alarid, J., appendix opinion of the
court of appeals adopted by New Mexico Supreme Court).
152. See id. at 619.
153. Id. at 619 (citation omitted).
154. See id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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Proper respect for human life does not require a court to reach a
decision that is inconsistent with the needs of the parents and the children. a57 Families are literally torn apart by divorce as a result of financial burdens.' 58 To adopt a policy that increases the financial
burden on families who have chosen not to procreate would further
diminish the family unit. 59 In conclusion, a decision to award damages 60for raising children would strengthen, rather than weaken, family
life.'

An award of child-rearing damages under the Full Recovery Rule is
the most reasoned approach. First, it will allow the best interest of the
child to be protected. Second, it will strengthen the family unit.
Third, it will advance the goal of tort law. Finally, it will advance the
goals of social justice.
3. Benefits Rule-Rejected by Texas Courts
The third approach evaluated by the Texas courts in the awarding of
wrongful pregnancy damages involves the Benefits Rule. The Benefits Rule allows for the recovery of child-rearing expenses, but the expenses are offset by the benefits the parents will receive by having a
normal, healthy child.16' The Benefits Rule is derived from the equitable principle of unjust enrichment and attempts to balance the Lim1 62
ited Recovery and the Full Recovery rules of just compensation.
The trier of fact, usually the jury, is required to balance the benefits to
the parents of the healthy child with the detriment incurred and determine the damages award.

63

The Texas cases to evaluate the Benefits approach include Terrell v.
Garcia,'6 4 Hickman v. Myers,'6 5 and Flax v. McNew. 6 6 In all three
of
1 67

these opinions the courts have rejected the Benefits approach.
In Terrell, the first Texas case to evaluate the Benefits Rule, the
court evaluated the approach taken by a 1971 Michigan appellate
court in Troppi v. Scarf.1 68 In Troppi, the appeal was from the dismissal of a complaint brought against a pharmacist by parents of a normal, healthy child conceived after the pharmacist supplied the mother
with tranquilizers instead of birth control pills. 169 Damages were
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See Flax v. McNew, 896 S.W.2d 839, 843 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995, no writ).
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
165. 632 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
166. 896 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995, no writ).
167. See Hickman, 632 S.W.2d at 871; Terrell, 496 S.W.2d at 128; Flax, 896 S.W.2d
at 843.
168. 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
169. See id. at 512.
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sought for several items of expenses: (1) the mother's lost wages; (2)
medical and hospital expenses; (3) pain and mental anguish of the
mother incident to the birth; and (4) economic costs of rearing such an
unwanted child. 7 ' The court in Troppi held "there is no valid reason
why the trier of fact should not be free to assess damages as it would
in any other negligence case. 17 1 In addition, the court rejected the
argument that this type of suit was against public policy noting recognition of the use of contraceptives by the legislature of Michigan and
the United States Supreme Court.1 72
The court in Troppi adopted the "Benefits Rule" from the Restatement Second of Torts. 7 3 Section 920 of the Restatement Second of
Torts states that
[w]hen the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the
plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred a special
benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of
the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to the
extent that this is equitable. 7 4
The court in Terrell, however, disagreed with the theory behind the
Benefits approach as established in Troppi. The court in Terrell stated
that the Benefits approach
[would] present insurmountable problems of proof under our present standards for proof of damages. Proof could undoubtedly be
offered regarding the cost of care and maintenance for a hypothetical child, although the standard of living and extent of education to
considerable
be provided such child would undoubtedly require
17 5
conjecture and speculation by the trier of fact.
In addition, the court in Terrell acknowledged that "the rearing of a
child would not be a profitable undertaking if considered from the
economic loss alone."1 7 6 The court justified this disparity by concluding that, with respect to public policy, "the satisfaction, joy and companionship which normal parents have in rearing a child make such
economic loss worthwhile."' 7 7 As stated above, the court reasoned
that instead of attempting to place value on the intangible benefits
derived from rearing children, public sentiment dictates that the benefits to the parents outweigh any economic harm suffered in raising and
educating a healthy, normal child. 178 Therefore, Terrell stands for the
proposition that even though children are an economic burden on the
170. See id.
171. Id. at 516.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 517-18 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979)).
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979).
175. Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ.
ref'd n.r.e.).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See id.
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family unit, parents should not be compensated beyond the intangible
benefits they receive from raising a healthy child. Terrell also stands
for the proposition that the Benefits approach would be speculative
and "present insurmountable problems of proof."' 7 9
In Hickman v. Myers, 8 0 the plaintiffs sued the physician for the cost
of rearing a child after the alleged negligent performance of a tubal
ligation. 8 ' The plaintiff parents argued "that the birth of a healthy,
unplanned child is not a benefit which equals or exceeds the cost of
the child's upbringing as a matter of law."'
In arriving at its decision, the court reasoned that "a parent cannot be said to have been
183
damaged by the birth and rearing of a normal, healthy child.'
The Hickman court based its reasoning on the proposition established in Terrell and held that "the benefit of having a child cannot be
equated with or diminished by the economic burden of rearing that
child."' 8 4 The court added that "[t]he intangible, but all important,
incalculable but invaluable 'benefits' of parenthood far outweigh any
of the mere monetary burdens involved."' 8 5 In addition, the court
stated that "[p]ublic policy deems the birth of a healthy child a precious gift rather than a compensable wrong."18' 6 Therefore, the court
concluded that it would be an impossible task to determine or place a
dollar figure on the benefits received from a child in order to offset
the recovery of child-rearing damages.
The Benefits approach has been rejected by all the Texas courts that
have evaluated the rule. The courts addressing this claim have all concluded that the intangible benefits derived from raising a healthy child
outweigh any economic burdens placed on the family. This reasoning,
as discussed previously, should not stand. The approach that should
ultimately be adopted is the Full Recovery Rule.
CONCLUSION

The Texas Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the issue of
wrongful pregnancy. However, several Texas Supreme Court opinions, on closely related matters, have lead most intermediate courts to
conclude that Texas would recognize a wrongful pregnancy claim. All
but one Texas intermediate court explicitly recognizes a wrongful
pregnancy cause of action. The primary controversy in Texas over
wrongful pregnancy is in the award of damages. Texas courts have
179. Id. at 127.

180. 632 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
181. See id.
182. Id. at 870.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 871.
185. Id. at 870 (citing Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980)).
186. Id. (citing Wilczynski v. Goodman, 391 N.E.2d 479 (II. App. Ct. 1979)).
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evaluated the three common approaches to classifying and awarding
damages: (1) Limited Recovery Rule; (2) Full Recovery Rule; and (3)
Benefits Rule.
Texas has rejected the Full Recovery and Benefits approaches to
compensating the parents for the birth of the unwanted, but healthy,
child. Texas, instead, follows the Limited Recovery Rule. Texas views
the birth of a healthy child as a benefit rather than an injury because
the child's smile and affection outweigh the economic burden of child
maintenance and education. However, Texas courts are not uniform
in awarding damages to the parents of a healthy, but unwanted, child.
Most Texas courts have indicated their willingness to reimburse the
parents only for medical costs associated with the pregnancy and birth
of the healthy child. However, some recent opinions indicated that
expenses in excess of medical expenses may be maintained if properly
established. Despite the recent trend in awarding damages in excess
of medical costs, Crawford v. Kirk187 now indicates that parents
should only be compensated for their medical expenses associated
with the unwanted pregnancy. Crawford specifically ruled out the
ability of parents to collect child-rearing and maintenance costs because a child is not considered a damage and calculating damages are
too speculative. To date, no Texas courts allow recovery of child-rearing expenses.
However, Texas needs to re-evaluate its public policy view in assuming that the intangible benefits to the parents outweigh the economic burden on the family. Texas courts, as courts in other states
have done, should consider wrongful pregnancy as a normal medical
malpractice claim. The damage when a normal healthy child is conceived as a result of a negligently performed sterilization is not the
birth of the child. Rather, it is the invasion of the parents' legally
protected interest in financial security of their family and the frustration of their desire to limit the size of their family. Parents should not
have the economic burden of raising an unwanted child thrust upon
them due to the negligence of a third party doctor.
Medical malpractice claims, like other tort actions, are created to
place the injured person in the position they would have been absent
the harmful act. However, by denying the parents the costs associated
with child-rearing and education, the parents will never be made
whole and the goal of tort compensation will not be achieved. Furthermore, each family has the constitutional right to have total control
over its procreational decisions. When a child is conceived after a
negligent sterilization procedure, the negligent doctor has frustrated
the parents' constitutionally protected interest in limiting the size of
their family.

187. 929 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, writ denied).
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A policy that allows doctors to perform negligent operations without being held legally responsible in tort actions does not further the
public's interests, but instead leads to the demise of the family unit. In
today's society, the intangible benefit of a child's smile does not outweigh the economic burden thrust upon the family.
If the Texas Supreme Court were to deny recovery of child rearing
expenses, the court as an alternative should, at a minimum, award
damages to the parents in excess of medical expenses. Such damages
may not include damages for emotional distress, as barred by the
Texas Supreme Court, but should include damages such as: (1) prenatal and postnatal medical expense; (2) mother's lost wages; (3)
mother's pain and suffering during the pregnancy and delivery; (4)
loss of consortium; (5) the cost of a second corrective sterilization procedure; and (6) mother's pain and suffering associated with the corrective procedure. All of these damages are readily proveable and are
not subject to speculation. Allowing parents to prove and recover
child-rearing damages strengthens the family unit, maintains the best
interest of the child, and best advances the goals of tort law and Texas
public policy.
David Shurtz
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